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I. INTRODUCTION
The Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children
of New Jersey Act (“TEACHNJ” or “the Act”) has never been about
New Jersey’s students.1 But its proponents in Trenton have always
made sure to discuss the Act as if it were. Nonetheless, the Act
focuses its attention squarely on teachers. Without any particular
rationale, the Act makes it more difficult for teachers to attain
tenure, and much easier to scrutinize and to fire teachers once they
have tenure. However, the Act’s scheme for achieving its actual goals
lacks effective evaluation procedures and runs afoul of wellestablished due process rights. In short, the TEACHNJ Act does not
do what it says it does, is not particularly good at what it actually
does, and is without adequate procedural safeguards.
On May 23, 2011, State Senator Teresa Ruiz, a Democrat from
Essex County, told The Star Ledger that she would introduce the
TEACHNJ Act later that week.2 In its original form, Senator Ruiz’s
bill effectively ended tenure in New Jersey.3 The bill eliminated all
due process for tenure removal.4 It authorized local principals to
revoke a teacher’s tenure after two years of ineffective ratings if the
principal felt that the teacher was not following an individualized
1
Although the stated goal of the TEACHNJ Act is to “raise student achievement
by improving instruction,” the statute’s focus is the employment conditions of
teachers, including its main goal of tenure reform. Guide to the TEACHNJ Act, NEW
JERSEY DEP’T OF EDU., http://www.nj.gov/education/AchieveNJ/intro/TeachNJGuide.pdf
(last updated June 2014). The New Jersey Department of Education stated that:
At its core, TEACHNJ reforms the processes of earning and maintaining
tenure by improving evaluations and opportunities for professional
growth. Specifically:
•
Tenure decisions are now based on multiple measures of
student achievement and teacher practice as measured
by new evaluation procedures.
•
Lengthy and costly tenure hearings are shorter, focused
on process only, and less expensive.
•
Educator feedback and development is more
individualized and focused on students.
Id. See also Jarrett Renshaw, Gov. Christie Signs Teacher Tenure Overhaul Bill, THE STAR
LEDGER (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/08/gov_christie_
signs_teacher_ten.html (quoting State Senate President Stephen Sweeney as saying “We
can’t have the bad ones in schools anymore. One bad teacher is one bad teacher too
many.”).
2
Jessica Calefati, State Sen. Teresa Ruiz Pushes New Teacher Tenure Reform, THE STAR
LEDGER (May 23, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/05/nj_democrat_
pushes_new_tenure.html.
3
See Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey
(TEACHNJ) Act, S. 2925, 214th Leg. (2011), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us
/2010/Bills/S3000/2925_I1.PDF [hereinafter Sen. Ruiz TEACHNJ Proposal].
4
Id.
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improvement plan.5 The bill also included a longer probationary
period for teachers prior to tenure, a teacher evaluation tool based
on student test scores, a two-tier teacher rating system of effective
and ineffective, and a professional development piece as well.6
Despite the bill’s evident focus on firing teachers, Senator Ruiz told
The Star Ledger, “I approached this bill through the lens of
supporting and elevating the profession, but most importantly with
a vision of the children whose futures are at stake.”7
Senator Ruiz was not alone in her zeal to upend the teaching
profession. This incarnation of the TEACHNJ Act came fast on the
heels of separate, similar education reform legislation introduced by
Republican State Senator Joe Kyrillos and supported by Republican
Governor Chris Christie.8 Senator Kyrillos’ bill differed mainly from
Senator Ruiz’s bill in its lack of professional development for
teachers.9 Prior to Senator Kyrillos’ bill, the governor himself had
proposed teacher reforms mandating merit pay and ending last-in,
first-out job protections.10 Echoing Senator Ruiz, a spokesman for
Senate Republicans invoked the children: “Reforming tenure is
absolutely essential to making sure every student is being taught by
an effective educator.”11 This rhetoric and the accompanying wave
of legislative proposals suggest that New Jersey’s children were in
dire straits.
Yet, New Jersey’s children were quite well educated at the
time.12 According to the National Center for Education Statistics
5

Id.
Id.
7
Calefati, supra note 2.
8
Id.
9
Compare Sen. Ruiz TEACHNJ Proposal with School Children First Act, S. 2925,
214th Leg. (2011) (sponsored by Sen. Joseph M. Kyrillos, Jr.), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S3000/ 2881_I1.PDF.
10
See Matt Bai, How Chris Christie Did His Homework, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/02/27/magazine/27christie-t.html?_r=0. The profile
noted:
The war between Christie and the union has two fronts, so closely
interrelated that it’s hard to separate them. First there’s the fight over
budgeting issues like pensions and benefits. And then there’s the “year
of education reform,” as Christie has proclaimed 2011, in which he
intends to push his case for merit pay, charter schools and the abolition
of teacher tenure — all of which are, of course, anathema to the union.
Id.
11
Calefati, supra note 2.
12
New
Jersey
State
Profile,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
EDUC.
STATISTICS,
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). In 2013, New
Jersey fourth, eighth, and twelfth graders scored higher than the national average on
both Math and Reading standardized tests. Id.
6
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(“NCES”), in 2011, the year TEACHNJ was first introduced, New
Jersey’s fourth graders ranked fourth and second in the nation in
mathematics and reading, respectively.13 Eighth graders ranked
third and second in those subjects.14 In 2010, the New Jersey
Education Association (“NJEA”) noted, and Politifact confirmed,
that New Jersey’s public high school students achieved the highest
average Advanced Placement test score in the entire country.15
Without regard for this success, the governor and both parties in the
legislature were clamoring for tenure reform.
On August 6, 2012, Governor Christie signed the revised
TEACHNJ Act into law.16 The Act had been passed unanimously in
both the Senate and the Assembly.17 This version of the bill saw
input from both the governor and the NJEA.18 Governor Christie
went so far as to thank the union he had previously referred to as
thugs for the important role they played in the bill’s success.19 An
13

Id.
Id. The rankings are based on student scores on the National Assessment of
Educational Progress. Professor Diane Ravitch described the NAEP scores in the
following manner:
[They are] [t]he only test scores that can be used comparatively . . .
because [NAEP] is a no-stakes test. No one knows who will take it, no
one knows what will be on the test, no student takes the full test, and the
results are not reported for individuals or for schools. There is no way
to prepare for NAEP, so there is no test prep. There are no rewards or
punishments attached to it, so there is no reason to cheat, to teach to the
test, or to game the system.
DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND THE
DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 125 (2013) [hereinafter RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR].
15
Erin O’Neill, NJEA Claims New Jersey Public School Students Have Best Advanced
Placement Scores in Nation, POLITIFACT (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/newjersey/statements/2011/sep/04/new-jersey-education-association/njea-claims-newjersey-public-school-students-have/ (“The NJEA claims the state’s public school
students have the best Advanced Placement test scores in the country. PolitiFact New
Jersey compared the average AP test scores for students across the nation and found
New Jersey’s public school students rank first.”).
16
Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey
(TEACHNJ) Act, S. 1455, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012).
17
Salvador Rizzo, Sweeping N.J. Teacher’s Tenure Bill Passes Legislature, Heads to Gov.
Christie’s
Desk,
THE
STAR-LEDGER
(June
25,
2012,
10:05
PM),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/06/sweeping_nj_teachers_tenure_ bi.html.
18
Id.; Barbara Keshishian, Testimony Before the Senate Budget and Appropriations
Committee
S-1455
(Jun.
18,
2012)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.njea.org/news/2012/06/18/testimony%20by%20njea%20president%20b
arbara%20keshishian) (mentioning “extensive discussions over the last several
months”).
19
Renshaw, supra note 1 (“The fact of the matter is nothing gets done without their
input, support and their help. I know it’s not everything they wanted to have happen,
and it wasn’t everything that I wanted to have happen.”). The public thank you of the
14
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NJEA spokesman said, “Everyone agreed that we needed to do
something.”20 State Senate President Stephen Sweeney, a Democrat
from Gloucester County, added, “We can’t have the bad ones in
schools anymore. One bad teacher is one bad teacher too many.”21
The national media lauded the bill’s passage as an example of
Governor Christie’s ability to make tough compromises, even in a
state where the teachers’ union is quite strong.22 Amidst all the
praise, then Mayor of Newark Cory Booker and Education
Commissioner Chris Cerf criticized the bill for not going far enough
to reduce teachers’ job protections.23 In a statement, Senator Ruiz
again looked to the children: “By strengthening our professionals,
we will ensure that our students have the best teachers in the
classroom so that all children—regardless of their background, their
ZIP code, or their socio-economic status—will have the
opportunities they deserve for educational excellence.”24
Despite Senator Ruiz’s public comments focusing on students,
and the TEACHNJ Act’s official purpose to “raise student
achievement by improving instruction through the adoption of
evaluations that provide specific feedback to educators” and
teachers’ union was much different from 2011 when Governor Christie stated:
I believe the teachers in New Jersey in the main are wonderful public
servants that care deeply. But their union, their union are a group of
political thugs. They should have taken the salary freeze. They didn’t
and now, you know, we had to lay teachers off. They chose to continue
to get their salary increases rather than be part of the shared sacrifice.
Bradley Blackburn, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie Calls His State’s Teachers Union
‘Political Thugs,’ ABCNEWS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/jerseygovernor-chris-christie-calls-teachers-union-political /story?id=13310446.
20
Rizzo, supra note 17.
21
Renshaw, supra note 1.
22
See John Martin, N.J. Gov. Christie Signs Bipartisan Reform of Nation’s Oldest
Teacher Tenure Law, CNN’ SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT BLOG (August 7, 2012, 2:41 PM),
http://schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/07/n-j-gov-christie-signs-bipartisanreform-of-nations-oldest-teacher-tenure-law/ (“Groups that have traditionally been at
odds worked together to craft and pass the bill sponsored by both Democratic and
Republican lawmakers. Not a single member of New Jersey’s bicameral legislature
voted against it.”); Kate Zernike, Christie Signs Bill Overhauling Job Guarantees for
Teachers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/nyregion
/christie-signs-bill-overhauling-teacher-tenure.html?r=0 (“The new law suggests how
much the landscape has changed on revising education, and on tenure, long among
the most contentious issues for teachers’ unions and legislatures.”); Cf. Steve Kornacki,
What Chris Christie Didn’t Tell You, SALON (Aug. 29, 2012, 7:53 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/08/29/what_chris_christie_didn’t_tell_you/(“Again,
Christie can claim some credit here for pushing the issue aggressively in the public
square and making it a priority.”).
23
Rizzo, supra note 17; Renshaw, supra note 1.
24
Rizzo, supra note 17.
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“inform personnel decisions,” the legislation’s actual target is
teacher job protections.25 This Note will critique the TEACHNJ Act’s
changes in teacher evaluations and tenure proceedings, and provide
recommendations for solving those issues. Part II will provide a
brief history of tenure and teacher evaluation in the United States
generally, along with an explanation of its creation in New Jersey.
Additionally, Part II will survey recent legislation affecting these
topics, including a discussion of Vergara v. California, wherein a
California trial court declared the state’s tenure laws
unconstitutional. Part III will appraise the likelihood that the Act’s
changes in teacher evaluations will meet the Act’s goals. Part IV will
analyze the constitutional issues raised by the new tenure removal
scheme, along with the Office of Administrative Law’s contrasting
procedures.
II. TENURE: PAST, PRESENT, AND NEW JERSEY
A. Tenure’s Past and Present
Tenure began as a result of the recognition that civil service
employees needed protection from the vicissitudes of politics.26 In
the late nineteenth century, the National Education Association
(“NEA”) thought of tenure as a means of shielding teachers from
parents, administrators, and boards of education.27 The topic
headlined the organization’s first conference, held in Chicago in
1887.28 By the early twentieth century, the NEA espoused tenure as
an essential component of all teachers’ contracts.29 In 1946, the
25

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-118 (West 2014).
Patricia L. Marshall, Debra V. Baucom & Allison L. Webb, Do You Have Tenure,
and Do You Really Want It?, CLEARING HOUSE, May-Jun., 1998, at 302, 302-05. See also
DANA GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST EMBATTLED
PROFESSION 230 (2014) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS] (“But the history of
American public education shows that teachers are uniquely vulnerable to political
pressures and moral panics that have nothing to do with the quality of their work.”).
27
Marshall, Baucom & Webb, supra note 26, at 302; M. J. Stephey, A Brief History
of Tenure, TIME, Nov. 17, 2008, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1859505,00.html (“Just as steel and auto workers fought against unsafe
working conditions and unlivable wages, teachers too demanded protection from
parents and administrators who would try to dictate lesson plans or exclude
controversial materials like Huck Finn [sic] from reading lists.”).
28
Stephey, supra note 27 (“The start of the tenure movement paralleled similar
labor struggles during the late 19th century . . . . In 1887, nearly 10,000 teachers from
across the country met in Chicago for the first-ever conference of the National
Educator’s Association, now one of the country’s most powerful teachers’ unions.”).
29
Marshall, Baucom & Webb, supra note 26, at 302. See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note
26, at 7:
26
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NEA stated a formal position on tenure embracing both the removal
of incompetent teachers and the retention of skilled ones.30 The
implementation of tenure continued across the country, firmly
rooting its protections in most school districts by the late 1960s.31
In recent years, education reformers have attacked tenure,
characterizing it as intentionally inefficient.32 They claim that
tenure shields incompetent teachers.33 They say that it is so difficult
to remove a teacher that administrators prefer to allow bad teachers
to continue working, rather than begin the process.34 Reformers
attack the tenure removal process for expense, saying that even if a
district begins gathering the information necessary to fire a teacher,
the costs are prohibitive, often citing numbers as high as
$450,000.35 The New Jersey Department of Education’s own
explanatory material on the TEACHNJ Act calls tenure hearings
lengthy and expensive.36 Since tenure is inefficient, difficult to
remove, cumbersome, and expensive, the argument goes, it needs to
be scrapped.
These arguments have persuaded some state legislatures to
become skeptical of tenure protections.37 Laws in Alabama,
Yet tenure predates collective bargaining for teachers by over half a
century. Administrators granted teachers tenure as early as 1909, before
unions were legally empowered at the negotiating table to demand this
right. During the Progressive Era, both ‘good government’ school
reformers and then-nascent teachers unions supported tenure, which
prevented teaching jobs from being used as political patronage and
allowed teachers to challenge dismissals or demotions, once
commonplace, based on gender, marital status, pregnancy, religion,
ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, or political ideology. Tenure has long
existed even in southern states where teachers are legally barred from
collective bargaining.
Id. (emphasis in original).
30
Marshall, Baucom & Webb, supra note 26, at 302.
31
Id.
32
Steven Brill, The Teachers’ Unions’ Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/magazine/23Race-t.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0; Stephey, supra note 27.
33
Brill, supra note 32; Stephey, supra note 27.
34
Vergara v. State of California, No. BC484642 2014 WL6478415, at *5 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).
35
Stephey, supra note 27; Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *5. It is difficult to find
credible information supporting this figure. It is repeated often on various anti-tenure
advocacy websites and by newspapers on that side of the issue as well. But aside from
conclusory statements asserting the claim, the author has not been able to find a single
disinterested and open accounting of the cost of tenure proceedings.
36
N.J DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDE TO THE TEACHNJ ACT (2014), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/education/Achieve NJ/intro/TeachNJGuide.pdf.
37
Laura McNeal, Total Recall: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Tenure, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. &
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Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, and New Hampshire have all
drastically weakened tenure.38 Generally, these laws alter tenure by
reducing the amount of process necessary for removal, linking
significant portions of evaluations to student test scores, and
increasing probationary periods.39 Florida and Idaho’s laws have
explicitly eliminated tenure, while Colorado’s law essentially does
so without acknowledging it.40
Reformers have not limited their campaign to legislation.
Students Matter, a pet project of Silicon Valley entrepreneur David
Welch, uses the courts to advance its agenda.41 Welch’s group
recruited nine public school children and paid the law firm of
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 1.1 million dollars to challenge
California’s tenure removal process, two-year probationary period,
and seniority rule.42 The case became Vergara v. California.43 It
ended with a trial court judge declaring California’s tenure laws
unconstitutional, and calling on the legislature to fix the situation.44
EMP. L.J. 489, 496 (2013); Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *6.
38
McNeal, supra note 37, at 496. See ALA. CODE § 16-24C-4 et seq. (2013); S.B. 10191, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010); S.B. 736, 2011 Sess. (Fla. 2011);
S.B. 1327, 61st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2012) (The Students Come First Bill was
repealed by voters on Nov. 6, 2012. See Vol. 13-1 Idaho Admin. Bull. 35 (Jan. 2,
2013)); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 38.83 et seq. (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:4 (2010
& Supp. 2012).
39
McNeal, supra note 37, at 496.
40
McNeal, supra note 37, at 496, 500.
41
Adolfo Guzman-Lopez, The Lawsuit’s Called Vergara, but the Name You Should
Know is Welch, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 25, 2014),
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/education/2014/04/25/16461/the-lawsuit-s-calledvergara-but-the-name-you-shou/. Welch made sure to mention the children when
discussing his organization, though he declined to discuss the amount of money he
had poured into it:
Despite not having a background in public education, [Welch] said he
had no choice but to take on the issue. “About four years ago, I got to
the point where there was [sic] too many children that were being
harmed in the system,” he said. “If I had the capability of doing the right
thing to make life better for someone else or for my society, then I try to
do it.” In interviews, Welch wouldn’t say how much money the case has
cost him. It’s no doubt been substantial. Tax records for 2012 show he
loaned Students Matter nearly 1 million dollars that year alone, half of
which was spent on public relations.
Id. See also STUDENTSMATTER, http://studentsmatter.org/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
42
Guzman-Lopez, supra note 41; Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *2.
43
Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *1.
44
Id. at *7. Regarding a legislative response, Judge Rolf M. Treu stated:
Under California’s separation of powers framework, it is not the function
of this Court to dictate or even to advise the legislature as to how to
replace the Challenged Statutes. All this Court may do is apply
constitutional principles of law to the Challenged Statutes as it has done
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In Vergara, the court found these statutes have a serious and
negative effect on students’ fundamental right to equal education,
and they disproportionately affect poor and minority students.45 As
a result, the court applied strict scrutiny to the statutes, and the twoyear probationary period was struck down for its unfair treatment of
both students and teachers.46 The court held that the tenure removal
process was so burdensome in its complexity, length, and cost as to
be unnecessary.47 Calling the logic of the “last-in, first-out” seniority
statute “unfathomable,” the court stated that this part of California’s
tenure statute was unconstitutional as well.48
United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan hailed the
decision, calling it “an opportunity . . . to build a new framework
for the teaching profession that protects students’ rights to
educational opportunities while providing teachers the support,
respect and rewarding careers they deserve.”49 Students Matter is
considering similar actions in Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, New
Mexico, New York, and Oregon.50 As it stands, tenure protections
here, and trust the legislature to fulfill its mandated duty to enact
legislation on the issues herein discussed that passes constitutional
muster, thus providing each child in this state with a basically equal
opportunity to achieve a quality education.
Id.
45

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
47
Id. at *6.
48
Vergara, 2014 WL6478415, at *6.
49
Press Release, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, Statement from U.S.
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan Regarding the Decision in Vergara v. California
(June 10, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-secretaryeducation-arne-duncan-regarding-decision-vergara-v-california. Secretary Duncan’s
discussion of the decision invalidating teacher tenure laws focused on students:
For students in California and every other state, equal opportunities for
learning must include the equal opportunity to be taught by a great
teacher. The students who brought this lawsuit are, unfortunately, just
nine out of millions of young people in America who are disadvantaged
by laws, practices and systems that fail to identify and support our best
teachers and match them with our neediest students. Today’s court
decision is a mandate to fix these problems. Together, we must work to
fix public confidence in public education. My hope is that today’s
decision moves from the courtroom toward a collaborative process in
California that is fair, thoughtful, practical and swift. Every state, every
school district needs to have that conversation.
Id.
50
Jennifer Medina, Judge Rejects Teacher Tenure for California, N.Y. TIMES, (June 10,
2014), http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/us/california-teacher-tenure-laws-ruledunconstitutional.html:
Both sides expect the case to generate more like it in cities and states
around the country. . . . While the next move is still unclear, [Students
46
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are under attack in both legislatures and the courts.
B. Tenure in New Jersey
In New Jersey, tenure became the law in 1909.51 As of 2012,
New Jersey’s tenure law had not changed significantly over the more
than one hundred years of its existence.52 Teachers earned tenure
after a probationary period of three years of consecutive, satisfactory
service in the same school district.53 During the probationary
period, teachers could be fired without cause, that is, without
hearings as to the reasonableness of the grounds for their
dismissals.54
Matter] is considering filing lawsuits in New York, Connecticut,
Maryland, Oregon, New Mexico, Idaho and Kansas as well as other states
with powerful unions where legislatures have defeated attempts to
change tenure laws.
Id.
51
Rizzo, supra note 17. See also GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 7
(“Administrators granted teachers tenure as early as 1909”).
52
New Jersey School Boards Association, The New Tenure Law: What Board Members
Need to Know, 36 SCHOOL BOARD NOTES 4, Aug. 14, 2012 (referring to the TEACHNJ Act
as “the first substantial reform of teacher tenure laws in over a century.”).
53
School Officers and Employees—Improvements—Plans and Specifications,
2012 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 26 (SENATE 1455) (West).
54
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:27-3.2 (West 2014); Donaldson v. Board of Education, 320
A.2d 857, 861-62 (1974). In Donaldson, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
non-tenured teacher is entitled to a statement of reasons for dismissal upon request,
but not a formal hearing. Justice Jacobs stated:
The teacher is a professional who has spent years in the course of
attaining the necessary education and training. When he is engaged as a
teacher he is fully aware that he is serving a probationary period and may
or may not ultimately attain tenure. If he is not reengaged and tenure is
thus precluded he is surely interested in knowing why and every human
consideration along with all thoughts of elemental fairness and justice
suggest that, when he asks, he be told why . . . . The plaintiff does not
urge before us that, in addition to a statement of reasons, she was entitled
to a formal hearing before the board. For the present purposes, we
assume that no such hearing was required although we hasten to suggest
that a timely request for informal appearance before the board should
ordinarily be granted even though no formal hearing is undertaken.
Id. See also E. GORDON GEE & PHILIP T. K. DANIEL, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 390 (4th ed. 2009):
In fact, the vast majority of employees fall under the ‘at-will doctrine,’
meaning that persons can be terminated for good reason, bad reason, or
no reason. This was the ruling in the case of Castro v. New York City Bd.
Of Educ., 777 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), where a non-tenured
teacher challenged his non-renewal of contract, claiming a pretermination hearing was required. The court concluded that the teacher
served ‘at will’ in his non-tenured status and failed to prove that he was
dismissed for a constitutionally impermissible purpose.
Id.; Teachers’ Rights: Tenure and Dismissal, FINDLAW (May 12, 2015, 7:14 PM),
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Before TEACHNJ was enacted, once teachers earned tenure,
they were afforded due process before districts could fire them.55 To
prevail in an attempt to remove a tenured teacher, the district had
to prove one of four reasons for dismissal: inefficiency, incapacity,
conduct unbecoming a teaching staff member, or some other just
cause.56 The procedures were as follows: presentation of charges to
the local Board of Education (“Board”) by the superintendent,
certification of charges by the Board, filing of charges with the
Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”) by the Board, a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) from the Office
of Administrative Law (“OAL”), and a final decision on the ALJ’s
ruling by the Commissioner.57
C. TEACHNJ’s Changes to Tenure
The TEACHNJ Act makes significant changes to tenure. The Act
increases the probationary period leading up to receiving tenure
from three years to four.58 Administrators may base up to fifty
percent of teachers’ evaluations on student test performance.59 This
rule is satisfied through the creation of student growth objectives
(“SGOs”) by individual teachers.60
The Act mandates that
summative evaluations include four ratings: highly effective,
http://education.findlaw.com/teachers-rights/teachers-rights-tenure-anddismissal.html:
Prior to attaining tenure, a probationary teacher may be dismissed at the
discretion of the school district, subject to contractual and constitutional
restrictions. Laws other than those governing tenure will apply to
determine whether a discharge of a teacher is wrongful. If a probationary
teacher’s dismissal does not involve discrimination or does not violate
terms of the teacher’s contract, the school district most likely does not
need to provide notice, summary of charges, or a hearing to the teacher.
Id.
55
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-10 (West 2014):
No person shall be dismissed or reduced in compensation, (a) if he is or
shall be under tenure of office, position or employment during good
behavior and efficiency in the public school system of the state except for
inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause, and
then only after a hearing held pursuant to this subarticle.
Id.
56
Id.
57
School Officers and Employees—Improvements—Plans and Specifications,
2012 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 26 (SENATE 1455) (West).
58
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-5(a)(3)(b)(1) (West 2014).
59
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(4) (West 2014).
60
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:102.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis
2015).
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effective, partially effective, and ineffective.61 When a teacher
receives two consecutive ratings of ineffective, or a rating of partially
effective followed by ineffective, the superintendent must file tenure
charges.62 This requirement relieves the superintendent of the
discretion to decide whether to file charges that she possessed under
the old law. In the case of a teacher who receives ratings of
ineffective followed by partially effective, or partially effective in two
consecutive years, the superintendent retains that discretionary
power.63 When faced with a teacher receiving those ratings, the
superintendent may file charges or may defer by filing written
evidence of exceptional circumstances.64 Thereafter, the Board may
file the charges with the Commissioner within thirty days, unless
the Board decides that the evaluation process was not followed.65
The Act completely removes the OAL from the tenure hearing
process.
In its stead, the Act places compulsory, binding
arbitration.66 Once the Commissioner has the charges, the teacher
has fifteen days to file a response.67 The Commissioner has ten days
to submit the charges to an arbitrator.68 A hearing with the
arbitrator will then take place within forty-five days of the
assignment of an arbitrator.69 The arbitrator then has forty-five days
from the start of the hearing to issue a decision.70 The arbitrator
may consider only the following four issues: (1) if the evaluation
failed to substantially follow the evaluation process; (2) “if there is
a mistake of fact in the evaluation;” (3) if the charges were brought
only as a result of discrimination, nepotism, political affiliation,
union activity, or other conduct prohibited by federal or state law;
and (4) if “the district’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.”71 The
Commissioner may set the arbitrator’s pay, though the Act suggests
that the arbitrator receive no less than $1250 per day.72 Should the
Commissioner elect to pay the arbitrator a different amount, the Act
61

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(1) (West 2014).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(1) (West 2014).
63
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2) (West 2014).
64
Id.
65
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2)(b) (West 2014).
66
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-16 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(e) (West
2014) (“The arbitrator’s determination shall be final and binding and may not be
appealable to the commissioner of the State Board of Education.”).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(b)(1) (West 2015).
70
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(d) (West 2015).
71
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.2(a)(1)-(4) (West 2014).
72
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(b)(2) (West 2015).
62
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requires the Commissioner to consider “the average per diem rate
of arbitrators eligible to serve on the panel, who reside in New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.”73 The state bears the cost of
the arbitration, and the Act no longer caps this expense.74
The Act received the support of the Democratic legislature, the
Republican governor, and the state’s major teachers’ union, the New
Jersey Education Association.75 The legislative and executive
branches in Trenton had not seen this level of accord at any time
since Governor Christie’s election.76
III. EVALUATIONS AND TESTS, DUE PROCESS AND HEARINGS
A. Teacher Effectiveness and Student Testing
The TEACHNJ Act compels schools to use teacher evaluations
that mandate reliance on student test scores. This requirement
ignores the primary role socio-economic status plays in student
achievement, fails to provide specific feedback to teachers about
instructional practice, and allows teachers to game an easily
circumvented system.77 Additionally, high stakes tests (such as the
73

Id.
Id. When the TEACHNJ Act was originally passed, the costs of the arbitration
were capped at $7,500. See School Officers and Employees—Improvements—Plans
and Specifications, 2012 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 26 (SENATE 1455) (West). This recent
change calls into question the likelihood that the Act will reduce the costs of tenure
proceedings. See discussion infra Part III.C.ii.
75
See Rizzo, supra note 17.
76
See, e.g., Todd B. Bates, One Thing N.J. Residents Agree on Is Partisanship, DAILY
JOURNAL (Jun. 6, 2011), http://archive.thedailyjournal.com/article/20110606/NEW
S01/106060317/One-thing-N-J-residents-agree-partisanship:
Last week’s war of words between Republican Gov. Chris Christie and the
Democrats didn’t move the two sides closer to harmony. The Democrats
criticized Christie for using a state police helicopter to fly to his son’s baseball
game and then to a political dinner. The governor, in turn, called one
assemblywoman [sic] a “‘jerk” over the issue and the Democrats said Christie “is
unable to discuss things like a grown-up.“
Id.; Christie Weighs Budget Cuts Amid Spat With ‘S.O.B.’ Democrat, NEWSMAX (Jun. 27,
2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/AMERICAME-BGVTTOP-BNALLBNCOPY/2012/06/27/id/443681/:
Governor Chris Christie called a New Jersey Senate Democrat an
“arrogant S.O.B.” over the failure to guarantee a tax cut in the
Legislature’s $31.7 billion spending plan, without saying whether he’ll
veto it. Christie’s comment referred to Senator Paul Sarlo, who heads the
budget panel. The Republican said he “got fooled” in swapping his
income-levy rollback for property-tax rebates, citing a six-month delay
and conditions set by lawmakers.
Id.
77
See ANYA KAMENETZ, THE TEST: WHY OUR SCHOOLS ARE OBSESSED WITH
74
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one New Jersey will use, created by the British corporation Pearson
and known as the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for
Colleges and Careers test (PARCC)) are prone to statistical errors
that make them unsuitable for evaluating teachers.78
Student test scores do not measure teacher effectiveness.
According to the Act, up to fifty percent of a teacher’s evaluation
must reflect student performance on standardized tests.79 Research
has long settled that the most important factors that influence a
student’s success as measured by testing are socio-economic, i.e.,

STANDARDIZED TESTING—BUT YOU DON’T HAVE TO BE 65 (2015). Kamenetz explains the
multiple ways economic struggle affects student achievement as follows:
Poor kids may not get the same quality sleep because they share a bed or
sleep on a couch. They may come to school without breakfast. Their
vision goes uncorrected. They are likely to have less educated parents
who own fewer books and talk to them less from the time they are
infants—a gap that’s been estimated at 30 million words by the time they
start kindergarten. They are more likely to suffer from “‘toxic stress”‘—a
parent in jail, abuse, trauma, or risk of homelessness—that interferes
with their ability to concentrate day to day and can distort their brain
development over time.
Id. Kamanetz goes on to quote the findings of Dr. Michael Freemark, a pediatrics
professor at Duke University, whose review of state test scores for students in Chapel
Hill and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina demonstrated that “‘85 percent of variability
in school performance is explained by the economic well-being of a child’s family, as
measured by eligibility for subsidized lunches.’” Id. See also DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH
AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE
UNDERMINING EDUCATION 258 (rev. and expanded ed., 2010) [hereinafter RAVITCH,
DEATH AND LIFE] (“Teachers can have a profound influence on their students, but on
average, what families do or don’t do influences academic outcomes even more.”).
78
Diane Ravitch, Schools We Can Envy, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Mar. 8,
2012), http://www.nybooks.com/ articles/archives/2012/mar/08/schools-we-canenvy/ (citing DANIEL KORETZ, MEASURING UP: WHAT EDUCATIONAL TESTING REALLY TELLS US
(2008)). Professor Ravitch mentions the findings of several researchers in this vein:
“[E]xperts like Robert L. Linn at the University of Colorado, Linda Darling-Hammond
at Stanford, and Helen F. Ladd at Duke, as well as a commission of the National
Research Council, have warned about misuse of standardized tests to hold individual
teachers accountable with rewards or sanctions.” Id. The PARCC describes itself as “a
group of states working together to develop a set of assessments that measure whether
students are on track to be successful in college and their careers.” PARTNERSHIP FOR
ASSESSMENT OF READINESS FOR COLLEGE AND CAREERS, http://parcc.pearson.com/ (last
visited Mar. 24, 2016). Despite this characterization, Pearson alone writes the test
questions, prints, delivers, and scores the exams, and bears responsbility for the security
of the test’s content. Kelly Heyboer, PARCC Exams: How Pearson Landed the Deal to
Produce N.J.’s Biggest Test, NJ.COM (Mar. 22, 2015, 11:17 AM),
http://www.nj.com/education/2015/03/parcc_exams_how_pearson_landed_the_deal
_to_produce.html. New Jersey expects to pay Pearson up to $108 million over four
years for this work. Id.
79
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(4) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:104.1(d)(1)-(4), (e) (LexisNexis 2015).
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family income, health, and neighborhood characteristics.80 For
example, a student born to a wealthy family or to educated parents
will usually outperform peers on standardized tests.81 If a student’s
family is both wealthy and educated, she is even more certain to
excel on such assessments.82 To the extent that a teacher’s effect on
a student’s test score is quantifiable, teaching only accounts for
between one and fifteen percent of the outcome.83
In this way, the Act substantially evaluates teachers using a
metric they do not control. The result of the Act’s focus on testing
is a measurement that reflects, for the most part, the student’s socioeconomic status, and not her teachers’ effectiveness. Since test
scores have little to do with instructional ability, the half of the Act’s
new evaluation system that districts may base on them does not
provide teachers with worthwhile feedback. Rather, this part of the
evaluation only suggests to teachers information to which they are
often already privy, that is, the student’s situation at home.
In addition to this redundancy, the fifty percent testing
component of the Act’s teacher evaluation scheme falls short of the
A student’s
Act’s goal of “provid[ing] specific feedback.”84
performance on one test on one day, or even on twelve tests on
twelve days over the course of an entire school year, reveals only a
snapshot of that student’s performance on those occasions.85 It
offers no explanation regarding what component of the teacher’s
practice affected the outcome.
Teachers may employ several different strategies over the course
80
See Dana Goldstein, Can Teachers Alone Overcome Poverty? Steven Brill Thinks So,
THE NATION (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/162695/can-teachersalone-overcome-poverty-steven-brill-thinks-so. See generally Kamenetz, supra note 77;
RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 77.
81
See Kamenetz, supra note 77; RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 77, at 286.
82
See Kamenetz, supra note 77; RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 77, at 286:
Unfortunately, every testing program—be it the SAT, the ACT, NAEP, or
state scores—shows a tight correlation between family income and scores:
Children from affluent families have the highest scores, and children from
poverty have the lowest scores. On the SAT for reading, students whose
family income is in the lowest bracket (under $20,000) have an average
score of 437, while students whose family income is in the highest bracket
(over $200,000) have a mean score of 568; the gap is as large and as
regular in mathematics. The same pattern is found on international
assessments.
Id. at 286.
83
See AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE-ADDED MODELS FOR
EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT (2014); Goldstein, supra note 80.
84
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-118(a) (West 2014).
85
See Ravitch, Schools We Can Envy, supra note 78.
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of a single lesson to help students. Test scores do not say which
ones work. They cannot discern whether it was a teacher’s
cooperative learning activities or her individual conferencing that
were effective. Nor do they address why they were so. This silence
of test scores regarding the efficacy of particular instructional
strategies frustrates the Act’s stated aim to provide specific feedback.
Rather than providing guidance, test scores leave teachers to guess
which aspect of their practice works. For this reason, fully half of
the Act’s evaluation scheme fails at its stated purpose.
The above discussion shows that test scores reflect socioeconomic factors more than teacher efficacy, and specify nothing in
particular regarding teaching strategies. Of equal significance is the
indifference of test scores to individual students.86 The possible
reasons in a student’s life for her success or failure on any given day
are myriad. An idiosyncratic love of Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s
novels, or a sibling’s skilled tutelage in trigonometry might
contribute to a fine grade on one occasion, just as an unexpected
family upheaval or a twenty-four hour virus may sabotage the grade
on another. Tests ignore the impact of the individual student’s
emotions, her likes and dislikes, and her personal motivation or lack
thereof. These facets of a student’s life profoundly influence her
ability to learn.87 However, half of the Act’s evaluation scheme relies
on a measurement that is unable to account for such concerns, while
at the same time being, in part, encumbered by them. Just as
teachers cannot control the socio-economic status of a student, they
cannot alleviate a student’s personal difficulties. Even so, the Act’s
testing mandate rates teachers as if a student’s personal obstacles do
not exist. The Act has created a teacher evaluation regime based on
86

See RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 77, at 162-63. Professor Ravitch
discusses the problem of student responsibility and test scores, along with that of
family responsibility and test scores, with specific reference to testing under the No
Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”):
One problem with test-based accountability, as currently defined and
used, is that it removes all responsibility from students and their families
for the students’ academic performance.
NCLB neglected to
acknowledge that students share in the responsibility for their academic
performance and that they are not merely passive recipients of their
teachers’ influence. Nowhere in the federal accountability scheme are
there measures or indicators of students’ diligence, effort, and
motivation. Do they attend school regularly? Do they do their
homework? Do they pay attention in class? Are they motivated to
succeed? These factors affect their school performance as much as or
more than their teachers’ skill.
Id.
87
Id.
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student performance that ignores the agency of the student.
Teachers’ evaluations should not be subject to the accidents of
students’ lives.
B. TEACHNJ and Cheating
Since teachers lack the ability to improve the most essential
components of a student’s test-taking ability (i.e., her socioeconomic status and her personal motivation), and because under
the Act that ability constitutes half of teachers’ evaluations, teachers
may find other ways to survive this threat. In short, high-stakes
testing often leads to widespread cheating by teachers and
administrators.88 Major district-wide cheating scandals have come
to light in Georgia, Nevada, and Washington D.C.89 In each case,
88
See GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 227. Goldstein lists several
disturbing findings regarding the relationship between high-stakes testing and
cheating:
Increasingly, there was evidence that a significant number of
unscrupulous administrators and teachers nationwide had responded to
the higher stakes attached to state-level standardized tests—evaluations,
bonus pay, and public release of data—by cheating. [Jack Gilum and
Marisol Bello of USA Today] studied six. . .states and found over sixteen
hundred examples of probable test score manipulation between 2002
and 2010. (The newspaper would have almost certainly found even
more cheating had it not zeroed in on only the most suspicious test score
leaps. For example: At one Gainesville, Florida, elementary school, math
proficiency rates jumped from 5 percent to 91 percent in three years.) A
subsequent investigation by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution discovered
196 school districts across the country with suspicious test score gains.
Id. See also RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 148-150 (discussing Washington
D.C.’s former superintendent, Michelle Rhee, and the “major cheating scandal” caused
by Rhee’s “relentless pressure to raise the passing rates on tests”).
89
See Michelle Rindels, 3 School Staffers On Leave In Vegas Cheating Probe,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014
/04/17/clark-county-cheatingteachers_n_5166780.html; RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR,
supra note 14, at 148-150; Alan Blinder, Atlanta Educators Convicted in School Cheating
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/us/verdictreached-in-atlanta-school-testing-trial.html?_r=0 (discussing a state investigation that
concluded “that cheating had occurred in at least 44 schools and that the district had
been troubled by ‘organized and systemic misconduct,’” and resulted in the conviction
of eleven public school educators on charges of racketeering). The presiding judge,
Judge Jerry W. Baxter of Fulton County Superior Court, ordered most of the teachers
and administrators jailed immediately, and took the opportunity to scold them thus:
“I don’t like to send anybody to jail . . . . But they have made their bed, and they’re
going to have to lie in it, and it starts today.” Id. Atlanta Superintendent Beverly L.
Hall had been charged as well, but she died before she could stand trial. Id. Prior to
coming to the Atlanta public schools in 1999, Dr. Hall, who investigators said “created
a culture of fear, intimidation and retaliation” that allowed “cheating—at all levels—
to go unchecked for years,” was the superintendent of the public schools in Newark,
New Jersey. See John Mooney, DOE Releases Two More Reports on School Cheating
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the district tied the evaluation of teachers to the performance of
students on tests.90 These states put teachers in an untenable
situation: their ability to pursue a calling was subordinated to the
socio-economic and emotional conditions of their students. Faced
with these grim odds, teachers and administrators aided students in
a variety of unethical ways to keep their own jobs.91
The TEACHNJ Act penalizes teachers for student test
performance in ways similar to the testing regimes in Georgia,
Nevada, and Washington D.C. This correspondence augurs
corresponding results for New Jersey. Teachers faced with the
possibility of losing their livelihoods may act to protect themselves
by resorting to cheating.
One aspect of the design of the TEACHNJ Act makes it rather
easy for teachers to manipulate their evaluations. Under the Act,
teachers’ evaluations involve SGOs.92 These instruments allow
teachers, in consultation with administrators, to determine which
students must improve, how much they must improve, and on what
assessments they must improve.93 Teachers may set different goals
Scandal, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 8, 2013), http:// www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/
04/07/doe-releases-two-more-reports-on-school-cheating-scandal/.
90
See Stephanie Banchero, Nearly Half of States Link Teacher Evaluations to Tests,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702039118
04576653542137785186; RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 148-150; Blinder,
supra note 89.
91
New Jersey has already experienced cheating scandals under the previous testing
regime. See Vernal Coleman, Woodbridge School Principal Encouraged Cheating on
Standardized Test, State Says, NJ.COM (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nj.com/middlesex
/index.ssf/2015/03/woodbridge_district_elementary_school_principal_ch.html:
[The Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance’s] investigation
alleges that during the 2010 and 2011 NJ ASK examinations,
[Woodbridge elementary school principal Cathie] Bedosky encouraged
test examiners and proctors to interfere with the independent work of
students taking the assessment, failed to properly train examiners and
utilized unqualified staff to fulfill test examiner positions . . . . Previous
investigations by DOE Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance
have implicated other township elementary teachers in testing scandals.
In 2012, five Woodbridge administrators [two elementary school
principals and three teachers] were accused by state investigators of
cheating, or encouraging students to cheat on state standardized tests.
Id. Mooney, supra note 89 (discussing reports from the New Jersey Department of
Education finding that in two East Orange elementary schools “several teachers either
breached proper security protocols or may have coached students to change answers”).
92
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(3) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:102.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis
2015).
93
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(6) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:102.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis
2015).
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for different students based on various and multiple starting
points.94 For instance, an SGO might state that eighty percent of
students who turned in seventy-five percent of the homework
assignments will reach the targeted score on a particular test. If, for
example, only forty percent of the entire class hands in seventy-five
percent of the homework assignments, the teacher has just excluded
more than half the class from the equation. This SGO has shielded
the teacher from her scores because the part of the class that does
not turn in enough homework is also likely to be the students in
need of the greatest assistance on tests.
In the 2014-15 school year, teacher-created SGOs will account
for twenty percent of teachers’ evaluations.95 Given the draconian
penalty of tenure removal for unsatisfactory test scores, teachers
have a strong incentive to rig this part of the Act’s evaluation method
to their advantage.
C. Tenure Proceedings
As part of its scheme to reduce teachers’ job protections, the Act
removed tenure hearings from the OAL and placed them in the
hands of appointed arbitrators.96
This reduction in tenure
protections does not address the Act’s stated goal of increasing
student achievement through better instruction. In addition, the
new plan subjects the tenure hearing process to undue political
influence.
The Act’s method for the appointment of the
Commissioner’s panel of arbitrators hearing tenure charges creates
a patronage system that allows interested parties to adjudicate
tenure proceedings, as long as they do so according to the wishes of
their benefactors.
i. Dismissal, Property Rights, and Interested Arbitrators
In its stated attempt to increase the success of students through
better instruction, TEACHNJ’s new evaluation and removal
procedures make it easier to dismiss teachers. However, there is no
evidence that reducing tenure protections leads to better instruction
or improved student achievement.97 States and districts that have
94
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-123(b)(2)-(6) (West 2014); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:102.4(b)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:10-4.2(e)(1)-(6) (LexisNexis
2015).
95
New Jersey Department of Education, Student Growth Objectives: Developing and
Using Practical Measures of Student Learning, 3 (2014).
96
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-16 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(a) (West
2014).
97
RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 129.
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previously made similar changes to their tenure rules have not seen
significant increases in student test scores.98 Moreover, there is no
guarantee that qualified replacements will be available to replace
dismissed teachers.99 In fact, firing teachers for inefficacy makes
recruiting new teachers more difficult.100 So, the greater ease with
which districts can lay off teachers under TEACHNJ will not solve
the problems its proponents claim exist. These measures may even
cause other problems.
The new removal procedures are not only likely to be ineffective
as far as improving instruction goes. By empowering interested
parties to hear tenure cases, they also corrupt the independence, and
therefore the legitimacy, of the proceedings overall. The New Jersey
School Boards Association (“NJSBA”) and the New Jersey Principals
and Supervisors Association (“NJPSA”) will appoint twenty-eight of
the fifty arbitrators on the panel.101 The state’s two teachers unions,
the NJEA and the American Federation of Teachers (“AFT”), will
appoint the remaining twenty-two arbitrators.102 Therefore, most of
the arbitrators deciding tenure charges will owe their appointments
to organizations whose members file and certify tenure charges, i.e.,
school boards and administrators.103 Just as dangerous for
98
Howard Blume, Schools’ Next Test is Getting Tenure Ruling to Pay Off in Class, L.A.
TIMES (June 11, 2014, 10:08 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-meteacher-decision-lawsuit-20140612-story.html (quoting Jesse Rothstein, associate
professor of public policy at the University of California, Berkeley, noting that
regarding states’ tenure reform measures, “There’s no evidence yet that these changes
have had a beneficial effect”).
99
Ray Fisman, How To Build a Better Teacher, SLATE (Oct. 20, 2014, 9:37 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/2012/07/how_to_improv
e_teaching_new_evidence_that_poor_teachers_can_learn_to_be_good_ones_.html;
GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS, supra note 26, at 230:
Even if test scores were a flawless reflection of student learning and
teacher quality, there is no evidence that the new teachers who replace
the bad teachers will be any better—it is practically impossible to predict,
via demographic traits, test scores, grades, or pathway into the
profession, who will become an effective teacher.
100
Jesse Rothstein, Taking On Teacher Tenure Backfires, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/opinion/california-ruling-on-teacher-tenure-isnot-whole-picture.html?_r=0 (“[F]iring bad teachers actually makes it harder to recruit
new good ones, since new teachers don’t know which type they will be.”).
101
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(a) (West 2015) (“[Eighteen]. . . arbitrators shall be
designated by the New Jersey School Boards Association, and 10 arbitrators shall be
designated by the New Jersey Principals and Supervisors Association.”).
102
Id.
103
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(1) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN § 18A:6-11 (West
2014). The names of the arbitrators and which organizations appointed them are
difficult to find. David Saenz Jr., Deputy Press Secretary at the New Jersey Department
of Education, provided the following information. The NJPSA-designated arbitrators
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impartiality is the prospect of arbitrators with deep ties to the
unions who appointed them to hear tenure charges.
The Act’s delegation of the authority to appoint the officials
responsible for tenure adjudication to interested private
organizations fails to satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process. This appointment method, along with the lack of an
explicit dismissal mechanism, vitiates the impartiality necessary to
make tenure proceedings constitutionally sound. The OAL’s
appointment and dismissal procedure for ALJs, on the other hand,
demonstrates proper regard to procedural due process standards.
Teachers, in New Jersey and elsewhere, have procedural due
process rights with regard to tenure. Procedural due process rights
attach when (1) the government acts, (2) against an individual, (3)
to deprive her of life, liberty, or property.104 Tenure removal meets
the first two elements because the government acts through its
agents (a superintendent and a board of education) to initiate the
process against a particular teacher. The third element is met
because the Supreme Court has said that teachers have a property
right in tenure.105
Teachers’ property rights in tenure originate in Board of Regents
v. Roth. In that case, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]o have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.”106 The Court clarified that the
are Lewis R. Amis, Stephen M. Bluth, Daniel F. Brent, Thomas J. DiLauro, Jacquelin F.
Drucker, Edmund G. Gerber, Gary T. Kendellen, Joseph Licata, Earl R. Pfeffer, and
Ernest Weiss. The NJSBA-designated arbitrators are Peter Adomeit, Scott E. Buchheit,
Dennis J. Campagna, Walter H. DeTreux, Mattye M. Gandel, Robert C. Gifford, Jay D.
Goldstein, David L. Gregory, Randi E. Lowitt, Andree Y. McKissick, Arthur A. Riegel,
Stephen J. Rosen, John E. Sands, Mariann E. Schick, Joel M. Weisblatt, and Perry Alan
Zirkel. The NJEA-designated arbitrators are Michael A. Berzansky, Melissa H. Biren,
Ralph H. Colflesh, Howard C. Edelman, Deborah M. Gaines, Thomas D. Hartigan,
Carol F. Laskin, James W. Mastriani, Ruth M. Moscovitch, Susan Wood Osborn,
Michael J. Pecklers, Gerard G. Restaino, Tia Schneider Denenberg, Robert T.
Simmelkjaer, and Barbara Zausner. The AFT-designated arbitrator is Timothy J. Brown.
The Commissioner appointed Joyce M. Klein and Alan A. Symonette. E-mail from
David Saenz, Jr., Deputy Press Secretary, New Jersey Department of Education, to
Author (Mar. 28, 2016, 8:20 PM) (on file with author).
104
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
257 (1970) (extending constitutional safeguards in the form of administrative hearing
rights to welfare recipients prior to termination of benefits due to ineligibility by a
government welfare agency).
105
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
106
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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Constitution does not create property interests, “[r]ather, they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”107
The Court held that the teacher in Roth had no property interest
entitling him to due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, because he had been hired using a series of one-year
contracts.108 By contrast, New Jersey’s tenured teachers have the
proper independent source of state law that secures their tenure
benefits and their entitlement to them.109 Therefore, they must
receive due process when the State seeks to deprive them of tenure.
Procedural due process protections require that an impartial
authority carry out adjudications.110 The TEACHNJ Act’s new
scheme for adjudication undermines impartiality by allowing the
appointment of biased arbitrators. Arbitrators are chosen by the
most interested parties in tenure hearings: school boards (the
NJSBA), administrators (the NJPSA), and teachers (the NJEA and the
AFT).111
Each one of these organizations has the responsibility to
represent its constituents. To do so, they will appoint arbitrators

107

Id. at 572.
Id. at 579. See also Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 (holding that a teacher in the Texas
state college system was entitled to a hearing and notice of grounds for his non-renewal
if the college had a de facto tenure system and the teacher was entitled to tenure under
it).
109
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-1 et seq. (West 2014); Spiewak v. Board of Education,
447 A.2d 140, 144 (1982) (holding that N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:28-1 to 18A:28-18 make
tenure a mandatory term and condition of employment that supersedes contractual
terms).
110
See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L. J. 455, 476 (1986) (“None of the core values
of due process, however, can be fulfilled without the participation of an independent
adjudicator.”); Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in
Administrative Proceedings, 36 S.D. L. R. 551, 554 (1991):
Whether legislative or court mandated, most procedural due process
rights give a party an opportunity to present the evidence and require
notice, a hearing, representation by counsel, transcription, crossexamination, and testimony. The procedural safeguards may appear to
insure [sic] due process rights; however, if the decisionmaker has
prejudged the matter or relies on evidence other than that presented at
the hearing, the procedural safeguards become immaterial.
An
independent and unbiased adjudicator is such an essential element of
accurate decisionmaking that without it there may never be due process.
Id.
111
N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A:6-17.1(a) (West 2014).
108
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sympathetic to the interests of their members. By the time the
tenure removal process makes it to an arbitrator, members of both
the NJSBA and the NJPSA have recorded their support for
removal.112 It follows that the NJSBA and the NJPSA will appoint
arbitrators who are likely to support the decisions of its members to
strip teachers of tenure. In the same fashion, NJEA and AFT will
both appoint and maintain arbitrators who have demonstrated
fealty to their own ranks. While, it is possible that some teachers
may present their cases before arbitrators who are biased in their
favor, nevertheless, given the appointment breakdown, it is more
probable that teachers will stand before an authority who owes her
power to the representative of the other side of the proceeding, that
is, the NJSBA or the NJPSA. The existence of this direct connection
between the adjudicator and one side of the dispute renders
impartiality unlikely.
Moreover, the Act’s reticence on the removal process for
arbitrators suggests an even greater problem for the impartial
authority obligation. The Act provides only that the Commissioner
may remove an arbitrator if she fails to meet the time constraints for
the proceedings without asking for an extension.113 The Act explains
how arbitrators are hired, but not how they are fired. If the
Commissioner cannot do it, who can? Both the Act and the
regulations are silent on this important issue. The answer may be
that the organizations that appoint are also the organizations that
remove. In that case, school boards and administrators, as well as
teachers, could dismiss arbitrators who do not rule as they see fit.
This scenario forecloses the possibility of disinterested adjudication.
ii. Time and Costs
The TEACHNJ Act’s removal of tenure proceedings from the
OAL in favor of binding arbitration might not solve the problems
of time and cost efficiency. The findings of New Jersey’s nonpartisan Office of Legislative Services (“OLS”) show that one of the
major claims reformers make to support the need for the Act’s
gutting of tenure protections—that removal costs hundreds of
thousands of dollars—is not adequately addressed by the Act. As to
the claim that firing a tenured teacher takes too long, the Act’s
provisions may not prevent lengthy proceedings.
With regard to expense, the OLS stated that it is possible that
112

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.3(a)(2), (b) (West 2014).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1 (West 2014) (providing the method for
arbitrator designation without any discussion of removal).
113
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costs associated with tenure charges will rise as a result of an
expected increase in the number of such cases.114 The OLS also
reported that the new evaluation system used to facilitate the firing
of tenured teachers will cost the state more than 52 million dollars
to implement, while noting that this number does not include other
costs of implementation likely to be borne by both the state and
local school districts.115
It is also not clear that the new scheme will make tenure
proceedings go faster. The Act allows for extensions at the request
of the arbitrator.116 No restrictions exist regarding the number of
extensions that the Commissioner may grant. Furthermore, the Act
provides that the arbitrator’s decision must be granted within fortyfive days of the start of the proceedings.117 No language in the Act
defines the “start” of the proceedings (do they begin when the
parties first discuss dates to appear before the arbitrator, when the
parties actually appear before the arbitrator, when testimony is
taken, or at some other point?). Whatever the speed of that
component of the process, judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision
remains available.118 In this way, the arbitrator’s decision lacks
finality, so the proceedings may continue.
At the least, there is uncertainty as to the ability of the Act to
curb the purported inefficiencies of the prior scheme.
IV. THE NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE CENTRAL
PANEL SOLUTION TO TEACHNJ
New Jersey’s OAL provides the best forum to adjudicate tenure
proceedings. The OAL’s organization as a central panel allows for
judicial independence while inspiring public confidence.119 Its ALJs
have clear appointment and dismissal procedures in place, thus
avoiding the due process and impartiality issues created by the
TEACHNJ Act.120
114
STATE OF N.J. OFFICE OF LEGIS. SERVS., LEGIS. FISCAL ESTIMATE, S. 1455, 215th Legis.
(2012).
115
Id. The report estimated the cost of implementing the new evaluation scheme
for principals would be 11.9 million dollars. Id.
116
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(g) (West 2014).
117
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(d) (West 2014).
118
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1(e) (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-7 (West
2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-10 (West 2014).
119
See STATE OF N.J. OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW, ABOUT THE OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW,
http://www.state.nj.us/oal/about/about/ (last visited May 4, 2015).
120
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-4 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West
2014).

PAXTON_FINAL_FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

EVERYONE AGREED ON SOMETHING

8/23/2016 11:15 PM

407

A. The Central Panel
In twenty-four states and the federal system, administrative law
cases are handled by a department within the agency that will also
be one of the litigants in those controversies.121 The agency staffs
this department with its own administrative law judges.122 These
ALJs hear and decide contested cases (though their decisions are
usually subject to review by the Commissioner).123 States attempt
to ensure the independence of these agency ALJs by implementing
various protections, usually concerning salary and removal. At the
federal level, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) guards that
independence in part by taking the hiring and firing of
administrative law judges completely away from the agencies.124
Two separate agencies, the Office of Personnel Management and the
Merit Systems Protection Board, handle these tasks.125
By contrast, New Jersey, along with twenty-five other states as
well as the cities of Chicago, New York City, and the District of
Columbia, has established stronger protection for judicial
121
See Ann Wise, Louisiana’s Division of Administrative Law: An Independent
Administrative Hearings Tribunal, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUD. 95, 95-96 (2010) (stating that
“The ‘central panel’ movement has been strong, and more than half the states have
adopted some form of quasi-judicial tribunal,” and listing the following twenty-six
states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisonconsin, Wyoming); Administrative Procedure Act
§ 1, 5 U.S.C.A. § 3105 (West 2015) (“Each agency shall appoint as many administrative
law judges as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance
with sections 556 and 557 of this title.”).
122
5 U.S.C.A. § 3105 (West 2015). Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & PETER
M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 463 (6th ed. 2009):
Almost every Congress sees the reintroduction of legislation proposing
to remove all ALJs from line agencies and establish them as a separate,
independent corps of administrative law judges . . . . [The location of
ALJs within agencies] is not only controversial, it is a unique compromise
between adjudicatory independence and managerial responsibility born
of the peculiar history of administrative governance in the United States.
Id.
123
DANIEL J. GIFFORD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 9 (2d ed. 2010).
124
5 U.S.C.A. § 5372 (West 2015); 5 U.S.C.A. § 7521 (West 2015).
125
5 U.S.C.A. § 5362 (West 2015); 5 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a) (West 2015). Removal of
federal ALJs under the APA not only involves a separate agency, it also requires good
cause, a determination on the record, and a hearing:
An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed
under Section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative
law judge is employed only for good cause established and determined
by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity
for hearing before the Board.
Id.
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impartiality in administrative proceedings.126 All of these states and
cities have created a free-standing central panel.127
A central panel is an independent office of administrative
law.128 It has a cadre of ALJs who adjudicate contested cases
involving other agencies within the central panel’s jurisdiction.129
The purpose of the central panel is to provide both the public and
the agencies due process and fair adjudications.130 For example, if
the state environmental protection agency and a developer have a
dispute, it will be heard by an ALJ in the central panel, rather than
by one of the agency’s own employees. The separation of both sides
from the adjudicator promotes facial and substantive fairness.131
Some central panels have seen their legislatures increase their
jurisdiction over time.132 Executive action, rather than legislation,
126
See Wise, supra note 121; A. Michael Nolan, State Agency-Based v. Central Panel
Jurisdictions: Is There a Deference, 29 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 1, 23 n. 69 (2009) (“In
addition, three cities have developed central panel hearing agencies: Chicago, Illinois,
the District of Columbia, and New York, New York.”); Larry J. Craddock, Final Decision
Authority and the Central Panel ALJ, 33 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 471, 476-77 (2013):
The central panel’s main role is to provide fair adjudications and due
process to both the litigating agencies and the public. The central panel
ALJ is independent of, and not subject to control or influence by, the
agencies for which the ALJ conducts hearings. Instead, the ALJ reports to
a chief ALJ or central panel director.
Id.
127
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1092.01 (2016) (establishing an office of
administrative hearings); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1001 (2015) (creating the office of
administrative courts in the personnel department); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-40 (2015)
(creating the Office of State Administrative Hearings within the executive branch of the
state government); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-4 (West 2014) (establishing the Office of
Administrative Law); N.D. Cent. Code § 54-57-01 (2015) (creating a state office of
administrative hearings).
128
Craddock, supra note 126, at 476-78. See also L. Harold Levinson, The Central
Panel System: A Framework that Separates ALJs from Administrative Agencies, 65 JUDICATURE
236, 236 (1981); Julian Mann III, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative Litigation: North
Carolina’s Office of Administrative Hearings, 15 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 151, 155
(1995) (referring to the central panel as an “autonomous, quasi-judicial, executive
branch agency”).
129
Craddock, supra note 126, at 476.
130
Craddock, supra note 126, at 476-77.
131
Levinson, supra note 128, at 245 (“While adoption of a central panel system
does not guarantee the independence of the ALJ from the agency, the central panel is
likely to be accompanied by greater independence. Perhaps more importantly, the
central panel system is generally perceived as a significant step toward ALJ
independence.”); Craddock, supra note 126, at 476-77; Hon. Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special
Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 405 (“The central
panel structure, especially the free-standing central panel, is the preferred structure
from a standpoint of adjudicatory professionalism, public confidence, and
judicial/decisional independence of the ALJs.”).
132
James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ Final
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has also increased the jurisdiction of central panels.133
Central panels support adjudicatory proficiency, decisional
independence, and public trust.134 They are also more efficient and
less costly than their intra-agency counterparts.135 Most importantly
for this Note, the central panel structure is free of the due process
and impartiality concerns created by TEACHNJ’s arbitrator
appointment method. The way that ALJs are appointed to New
Jersey’s OAL demonstrates this crucial difference.
B. New Jersey’s Administrative Law Judges
The appointment and removal of ALJs to New Jersey’s central
OAL suffer from none of the due process shortcomings of the
arbitrator selections instituted by the TEACHNJ Act. Unlike that Act,
New Jersey law openly explains the procedure for hiring ALJs. The
OAL’s statutorily created method for these appointments and
removals is transparent and subject to democratic controls. For
these reasons, New Jersey should return to using the OAL for tenure
proceedings.
The appointment of ALJs involves both the executive and the
legislature.136 With the advice and consent of the Senate, the
governor appoints the ALJ.137 The ALJ’s term is set.138 Her initial
employment is for one year, after which the ALJ may be reappointed
by the governor to a four-year term.139 Following this period, the
governor, again with the advice and consent of the Senate, may
reappoint the ALJ to terms of five years.140
The mechanisms for disciplining and removing ALJs are clear
and independent.141 The Director and Chief Administrative Law
Judge (“the Director”), who is also appointed by the governor with
the advice and consent of the Senate, evaluates ALJs focusing on
three areas of their performance as judges: competence,
productivity, and demeanor.142 The law commands the Director to
Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401, 405 (2005).
133
Id.
134
Felter, supra note 131, at 403.
135
Flanagan, supra note 132, at 405.
136
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-4 (West 2014).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014).
142
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-3 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West
2014).

PAXTON_FINAL_FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

410

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

8/23/2016 11:15 PM

[Vol. 40:2

consider several aspects of those parts of an ALJ’s work, including
impartiality.143 Notably, the methods the ALJ uses in arriving at her
decisions may be used in her evaluation, but not the results of those
methods.144
The differences between the methods of appointment at the
OAL and in the TEACHNJ Act could not be more pronounced. ALJs
in the central panel are appointed in an open public forum.
TEACHNJ’s arbitrators are picked behind closed doors. The OAL’s
ALJs are appointed by politically accountable people—the Senate
and the governor.
TEACHNJ’s arbitrators are backed by
organizations that the public cannot join, lobby, or change. Under
the OAL’s method, an open procedure by two politically
accountable branches of the government repeats for each ALJ after
the first year, and then again after four years, and every five years
thereafter. In this way, an ALJ’s appointment is subject to
predictable and regular democratic control. There is no democratic
control of any kind built into the TEACHNJ Act of the school
boards’, the administrators’, and the unions’ arbitrators.
V. CONCLUSION
The TEACHNJ Act’s attack on tenure does not solve the issues
attributed to tenure as it existed prior to the Act’s passage. The Act
imposes testing to evaluate teachers, despite testing’s inability to do
so effectively, and in the face of voluminous evidence denouncing
the practice. The Act’s evaluation scheme ignores the socioeconomic conditions and the diligence of the students it tests. The
Act’s harsh punishments for lagging test scores push teachers and
administrators to cheat.
Moreover, the Act infringes on
constitutionally protected procedural standards by allowing the
parties involved in tenure proceedings to choose their own
adjudicators.
To ensure fair and effective process for teachers, tenure
proceedings must be restored to the Office of Administrative Law,
examined independently of student achievement considerations,
and changed only insofar as such changes comport with the goals
of that office.

143
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014) (Other considerations the Director
must take into account include legal skills and knowledge of the law and new legal
developments, analytical talents and writing abilities, settlement skills, and
conscientiousness).
144
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014).

